BS ISO 20214 pdf free download

BS ISO 20214-2015 pdf free download.Space data and information transfer systems — Security architecture for space data systems.
This document is intended as a high-level systems engineering reference to enable engineers to better understand the layered security concepts required to secure a space system. As such, this document is a Security Architecture for Space Data Systems (SASDS).
This architecture uses the views described in the Reference Architecture for Space Data Systems (reference [B1]) developed by the CCSDS Architecture Working Group.
The SASDS will be used:
– to establish an overall CCSDS conceptual framework for the incorporation of security into the data systems of space missions;
– to define common language and representation so that risks, requirements, and solutions in the area of security within space data systems can be readily communicated;
– to provide a source of information for the security architects on a space mission to use to develop the system security design;
– to facilitate development of standards in a consistent way so that any standard can be used with other appropriate standards in a system.
1.1.2 SCOPE
This document presents a security reference architecture for space data systems and is intended to provide a standardized approach for description of security within data system architectures and high-level designs, which individual working groups may use within CCSDS.
For further information regarding security’s role in space systems, the reader is directed to the supporting CCSDS documentation listed in annex B.
1.2 DOCUMENT STRUCTURE
Section 2 provides an introduction into how the security architecture uses the Reference Architecture for Space Data Systems (RASDS).
Section 3 discusses the security concepts that need to be addressed by any security architecture.
Section 4 examines the security concepts and shows how the CCSDS architecture outlined in
sections 2 and 3 relate to each other.
Section 5 establishes high-level principles and the scope that the security architecture addresses.
Section 6 illustrates a series of mission profiles which help identify where security is
required, what the issues are, and what solutions are applicable.
Section 7 specifies the security reference architecture.
Annex A addresses security considerations pertaining to use of this Recommended Practice for developing real security architectures for missions.
Annex B lists informative references.
Annex C is a glossary of abbreviations and acronyms used in the document.
.3 GLOSSARY OF TERMS
A full glossary of security terms used within this document is available in reference [B9].
1.4 NOMENCLATURE
1.4.1 NORMATIVE TEXT
The following conventions apply for the normative specifications in this Recommended
Standard:
a) the words ‘shall’ and ‘must’ imply a binding and verifiable specification;
b) the word ‘should’ implies an optional, but desirable, specification;
c) the word ‘may’ implies an optional specification;
d) the words ‘is’, ‘are’, and ‘will’ imply statements of fact.
NOTE – These conventions do not imply constraints on diction in text that is clearly
informative in nature.
1.4.2 INFORMATIVE TEXT
In the normative sections of this document, informative text is set off from the normative
specifications either in notes or under one of the following subsection headings:
– Overview;
– Background;
– Rationale;
– Discussion.
2 THE CCSDS REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE 2.1 INTRODUCTION RASDS (reference [B1]) describes a method for analyzing complex space system architectures. This section briefly introduces these concepts prior to exploring how they can be used to address security concerns during system design. Reference [B1] should be consulted for more information on RASDS. 2.2 BACKGROUND Today, ubiquitous terrestrial network connectivity among principal investigators and mission operations has become standard. At the same time, computer processing power and communication resources have progressed steadily to the point that they are easily accessible to potential attackers. These two facts put mission operations more at risk than in the past when operations were carried out over closed, mission-specific networks, and computer and communication resources were not as powerful or widespread. The security risks to both spacecraft and ground systems have increased to the point where CCSDS must foster adoption of specific information security standards (as necessary) in order to protect mission- critical resources and sensitive mission information.BS ISO 20214 pdf download.